Drawing on Arab Barometer data, this article provides the backdrop for understanding continuity and change since the Arab Spring in national-level public opinion attitudes toward economic and political foreign policy issues in North Africa, inclusive of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia. The article leverages the concepts of differentiation and diffusion to understand how international affairs shape public opinion in North Africa since the Arab Spring. Three findings emerge. First, public opinion about domestic and international issues are linked in the minds of North African citizens and foreign policy issues are more important factors underlying pre-and post-Arab Spring politics than are often recognized. Especially in the post-Arab Spring era, Arab citizens widely see external interference as a problem and this perception increased in every North African country between 2013 and 2016. Moreover, there is considerable variation across and within North African states in attitudes toward economic and political foreign policy issues, including the Arab-Israeli conflict and attitudes about economic and security relationships with Israel. Anti-Israeli sentiment increased substantially in the years leading up to and following the Arab Spring. Finally, since the Arab Spring, anti-Americanism, as measured by negative perceptions of U.S. culture, has declined in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, but risen slightly in Egypt, even as North Africans demonstrate increased support for a U.S. role in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict during this same time period. These trends suggest that anti-Americanism is highly dependent on specific domestic and international developments and is highly complex in the Arab world.
Introduction
Authoritarian regimes in North Africa prior to the Arab Spring left citizens with limited power to hold their governments accountable. This was especially true of foreign policy. Under authoritarianism, foreign policy is traditionally the purview of the executive; other state and nonstate actors, including the citizenry, have limited ability to hold the executive accountable (Fish 2006 ). Yet, the efforts of Arab governments to shape communication about foreign policy issues and the attempts of citizens to influence outside powers via protest and boycott movements illustrate the degree to which Arab citizens are concerned about external issues affecting their region (Benstead and Reif 2017; Farah and Newman 2010) . Citizens throughout North Africa hold diverse views regarding foreign policy issues that affect their country (e.g., Benstead and Boduszynski 2015) . At times, the views of citizens run counter to longstanding government policies. But, in ways that are under-recognised, North African views have evolved during the last decade as well, with support for recognizing Israel declining across the region and antiAmericanism diminishing on some measures as well. Exactly why views have shifted in some countries and not others, and how these changes relate to the Arab Spring, is not well understood.
Yet, to varying degrees across North African countries, the Arab Spring opened up new avenues for citizens to contest foreign policy. Nowhere is this truer than in Tunisia, which transitioned to an electoral democracy following the ousting of President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali in 2011; newfound freedoms opened up the potential for public mobilisation on foreign policy issues, whether overt foreign policy issues like the Arab-Israeli conflict or indirect political issues like the domestic political economy. 1 Indeed, more than is reflected in the international media, the Arab Spring mobilisations were, at least in part, related to the proWestern and pro-Israeli policies of authoritarian Arab regimes. The role that regional and international issues played in shaping the Arab Spring, and how its aftermath will ultimately reshape the region's foreign policy, is a new and crucial research area for students of international relations and comparative politics.
Drawing on Arab Barometer data, this article provides the backdrop for understanding continuity and change since the Arab Spring in national-level public opinion attitudes toward economic and political foreign policy issues. I focus on all five North African countries, inclusive of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia. To understand the linkages between international and regional affairs and domestic public opinion, the article draws on the theoretical concepts of differentiation (the degree to which there is greater variation in public opinion across countries) and diffusion (the degree to which there is lesser variation in public opinion across countries) before and after the Arab Spring (Gourevitch 1978; . 2 The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. After providing an overview of survey research in North Africa that deals with citizen attitudes toward foreign policy, I briefly explore three public opinion issues related to North African foreign policy: public perceptions of the Arab Spring and external interference in North Africa, Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict, and perceptions of the West and especially the United States. A final section offers general conclusions.
Citizen attitudes toward foreign policy in North Africa
There is limited survey-based research on citizen attitudes toward foreign policy issues in North Africa (for exceptions, see Tessler and Warriner 1997; Zoubir and Aït-Hamadouche 2006; Tessler, Jamal and Robbins 2012; Tessler and Robbins 2007; Blaydes and Linzer 2012; Benstead and Reif 2017) . However, research using surveys of North African citizens is increasingly possible due to the rapid expansion of survey research in the Arab world, especially since the Arab Spring (see Table 1 ). Post-Arab Spring governments have allowed surveys to be conducted in several North African countries, including Tunisia and Libya, which were previously closed to survey researchers (Benstead 2017) . 3 As a result, there is a large body of publicly-available surveys from North Africa, including 10 datasets from the World Values Survey, 14 from the Arab Barometer, and 4 from Afro Barometer surveys.
[ Table 1] The Arab Barometer focuses most directly on international and regional affairs and offers the largest number of questions that are consistent from wave to wave and across countries on these topics (Jamal and Tessler 2008; Tessler, Jamal, and Robbins 2012) . In addition, survey research conducted by the Transitional Governance Project (TGP 2017), 4 the Program on Governance and Local Development (GLD 2017), 5 and other independent researchers has increased, most of which also focus on topics relevant to regional and international affairs (Bush and Jamal 2015; Bush and Prather 2017; Corstange and Marinov 2012) . These data allow researchers to compare attitudes pre-and post-Arab Spring throughout North Africa, considering the fact that a total of six major surveys by these groups have been conducted in Libya, seven surveys have been conducted in Algeria and Morocco, and eight surveys have been conducted in Egypt and Tunisia. These data can help us better understand why international and regional developments shape public opinion of economic and political issues within and across countries.
The Arab Barometer in particular includes an extensive number of questions over various years that permit an examination of the competing views and conceptions of some of the most salient foreign policy issues in North Africa. As of this writing, a total of four "waves" of surveys have been carried out in North Africa, including in 2006 (Wave 1), 2011 (Wave 2), 2013-14 (Wave 3), and 2016 (Wave 4). By looking at data from 2006-2016, one can fully appreciate how public opinion forms the backdrop for understanding continuity and change in national-level foreign policy issues. In this regard, it is important to note that this article is not meant to be an exhaustive survey of the foreign policy content of all national surveys conducted in North Africa, nor is it even meant to be a systematic analysis of all foreign policy issues treated in the Arab Barometer. It instead provides a brief overview of three foreign issues captured in the Arab Barometer surveys, including public perceptions of the Arab Spring and external interference in Africa, public perceptions of relations with Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict, and public perceptions of the role of the West, especially the United States. These issues provide the public opinion backdrop for understanding the evolving foreign policy roles played by the state and non-state actors explored in the other contributions to this special issue.
Public perceptions of the Arab Spring and external interference in North Africa
According to the first wave of the Arab Barometer that was conducted in Algeria and Morocco shortly before the Arab Spring (2006) (2007) (2008) , North African citizens identified a range of domestic problems as the most important issues facing their countries (see Table 2 ). The most important problem stated by respondents was their country's "economic situation," inclusive of poverty, unemployment, and inflation, which was mentioned by 56 percent of respondents in Morocco and 51 percent of respondents in Algeria. This was followed by "corruption," which was mentioned by 31 percent of respondents in Algeria and 27 percent of respondents in Morocco. Only 8 percent of Algerians and 4 percent of Moroccans mentioned "authoritarianism" as the most important problem confronting their country during the pre-Arab Spring. 6 Very few citizens in Algeria and Morocco identified foreign policy issues as the most important challenges affecting their societies. As noted in Table 2 , only 1 percent of Algerians and 1 percent of Moroccans cited "ending U.S. occupation in Iraq" as the most important challenge. Similarly, only 2 percent of Algerians and 2 percent of Moroccans cited the "Arab-Israeli conflict" as the most important challenge. In short, the Arab Spring was largely driven by perceptions of domestic as opposed to international issues.
[ Table 2 ] An emphasis on the overriding importance of the domestic dimension was reinforced by surveys carried out in Tunisia and Egypt in the immediate aftermath of the Arab Spring, in which few Tunisian and Egyptian citizens believed external issues played a role in causing the Arab Spring (see Table 3 ). When asked what they believed to be "the most important reason for the protests" that eventually toppled the Tunisian and Egyptian dictatorships, 54 percent of Egyptians and 63 percent of Tunisians cited "demands for improving the economic situation."
The second most important reason was "combatting corruption," which was cited by 29 percent of Egyptians and 44 percent of Tunisians. In sharp contrast, less than 1 percent of Egyptians and Tunisians cited external issues, whether their country's "pro-Western policies" or "pro-Israeli policies." Negative North African perceptions of foreign influence were particularly salient in response to the question as to whether respondents agreed "to some or a great extent" that "foreign interference" was "an obstacle to reform in your country" in the post-Arab Spring (see Figure 2 ). In 2016, those who agreed exceeded 70 percent in three North African countries: Algeria (76 percent), Tunisia (72 percent), and Egypt (72 percent). In the case of Libya, which was asked this question only in 2013 (a survey was not held in 2016), the percentage also exceeded 70 percent (77 percent were in agreement). Only in Morocco was this figure at a lower, but nonetheless relatively high level (49 percent in agreement). These results indicate strong North African public sentiment that their societies are less able to chart their own course against the tide of foreign interference. At the same time, however, the specific type of foreign interference (i.e., political or economic) or from where it emanates (i.e., the U.S., Europe, Russia, China, or the Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia) is not specified in this question.
[ Table 4 ). It is striking that the preferred policy across all five North African countries in 2013-14 was one of U.S. non-interference within the Arab world (i.e., "The U.S. Moroccans and 62 percent of Egyptians). In Algeria and Tunisia, however, decreasing numbers of respondents called for U.S. non-interference, thereby suggesting a desire -at least in these two countries -for a greater U.S. role within the region. Nevertheless, the opinion that the U.S.
should not intervene at all was by far the most popular answer among several important foreign policy-related responses, including should the U.S. intervene to promote democracy, promote economic development, promote women's rights, or contain Iran.
One of the most interesting shifts, however, involved the specific policy response as to whether the U.S. should attempt to "solve the Arab-Israeli conflict" (see Table 4 ). There was increasing support throughout North Africa from 2013 to 2016 for the U.S. to take on a more proactive role in this regard. The proportion supporting this policy increased from 7 to 23 percent in Algeria. In Egypt, it remained constant at 15 percent, while in Morocco it increased from 20 to 27 percent. In Tunisia, the increase was from 7 to 19 percent. This suggests that while sentiments among North Africans toward Israel have soured over the course of a decade, this has brought with it an increased demand for Western countries to assist with a resolution to the conflict.
[ Table 4 ] Finally, it is also striking to note the degree to which North African publics are willing to justify attacks against the United States (e.g., see Tessler and Robbins 2007) . This is clearly demonstrated by a question, which asked whether North African publics agreed or disagreed with the following statement: "The United States' interference in the region [Arab world] justifies armed operations against the United States everywhere" (see Figure 9 ). Whereas support for militancy increased from 40 percent to 61 percent in Algeria between 2011 and 2013, it nonetheless declined in Tunisia from 44 percent to 34 percent during those same years. In Morocco and Libya, the question has been asked just once, but a larger proportion of Moroccans (49 percent) than Libyans (37 percent) saw these actions as at least somewhat justified (Tessler and Robbins 2007) .
[ Figure 9 ]
Conclusion
These analyses illustrate the linkages between international and regional affairs and domestic public opinion and offer examples of public opinion differentiation (the degree to which there is greater variation in public opinion across countries) and diffusion (the degree to which there is lesser variation in public opinion across countries) before and after the Arab Spring (Gourevitch 1978; . Three findings emerge. First, public opinion about domestic and international issues are linked in the minds of North African citizens, and foreign policy issues, broadly construed, are more important factors underlying the pre-and post-Arab Spring than are often recognized by analyses that emphasize domestic issues (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015) .
Especially in the post-Arab Spring era, Arab citizens widely see external interference as a problem, and this perception increased in every North African country between 2013 and 2016. Second, there is considerable variation across and within North African states in attitudes toward economic and political foreign policy issues, including the Arab-Israeli conflict and attitudes about economic and security relationships with Israel. Anti-Israeli sentiment increased substantially in the years leading up to and following the Arab Spring, which also coincided with the second intifada. Finally, since the Arab Spring, anti-Americanism, as measured by negative perceptions of U.S. culture, has declined in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, but risen slightly in Egypt, even as North Africans demonstrate increased support for a U.S. role in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict during this same time period. These trends suggest that anti-Americanism is highly dependent on specific domestic and international developments, and in any case is highly complex, especially in the Arab world (Lynch 2006; Benstead and Reif 2005, 2013; Zoubir and Aït-Hamadouche 2006) . In sum, analyzing the continuity and change in national-level attitudes toward economic and political foreign policy issues in North Africa help inform our understanding of both the nuance of public opinion across North Africa, as well as how public opinion shaped the foundations and outcomes of the Arab Spring.
Notes
4 Ellen Lust, Lindsay Benstead, and collaborators launched the TGP (2017) to study the transitional politics of Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. 5 The Local Governance Performance Index was developed by Benstead, Landry, Lust, and Malouche to explain variation in education, health, and municipal service quality and transparency. The survey draws large samples of 300 more in each locality, allowing comparisons to be made across municipalities (GLD 2017).
6 Data weighted for all analyses of Waves 2 and 3 of the Arab Barometer. Post-2011 Pre-2011 Post-2011 Pre-2011 Post-2011 Pre-2011 Post-2011 Pre-2011 Post-2011 Morocco 2001 Question wording: "Some people attribute the lack of development in the Arab world compared to other parts of the world to external factors, while others blame internal factors. In your opinion, which is more important in causing the lack of development in the Arab world? 1. Internal factors. 2. External factors. 3. Both are equally important (Do not read)." Foreign interference is an obstacle to reform in your country. I agree to a great extent; I agree to some extent; I disagree; I absolutely disagree." Question wording: "Do you prefer that future economic relations between your country and Israel. Become stronger than they were in previous years; Remain the same as they were in previous years; Become weaker than they were in previous years." Public opinion attitudes about security relations with Israel (percentage)
Source: Arab Barometer, Wave 3.
Question wording: "Do you prefer that future security relations between your country and Israel. Become stronger than they were in previous years; Remain the same as they were in previous years; Become weaker than they were in previous years." Source: Arab Barometer, Waves 3-4. Question not asked in Waves 1-2.
Question wording: "What is the most positive policy that the U.S. can follow in our region? Promote democracy; Promote economic development; Contain Iran; Solve the Arab-Israeli Conflict; Promote women's rights; The U.S. shouldn't interfere." Question wording: "Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The United States' interference in the region justifies armed operations against the United States everywhere. I strongly agree; I agree; I disagree; I strongly disagree."
